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On 1 January 1981, Greece became the tenth member of what is now 
the European Union, well ahead of Spain and Portugal. This was a just 
reward for a country broadly seen at the time as an unqualified success 
story. Within just a few years after the 1974 breakdown of a fairly brief 
dictatorship (the so-called colonels’ regime that began in 1967), Greece 
had been able to establish—and by all appearances consolidate—a lib-
eral and pluralist system with fully inclusive institutions. The early 
postauthoritarian governments implemented brave policy reforms while 
striving for political moderation; they also kept the books in order by 
combining modest borrowing with fast economic growth. At the same 
time, society seemed to be vibrant and optimistic, with the country’s im-
minent EU entry promising new prospects and opportunities. For nearly 
three decades thereafter, and especially after its 2001 transition into the 
Eurozone, Greece appeared to be a perfectly democratic and increas-
ingly prosperous European nation.1 Hardly anyone seriously doubted the 
country’s continuing success. 
But when the global financial and economic downturn hit Europe in 
2008, Greece became its first and most abject victim. No longer able to 
repay its loans and faced with the specter of default, Greece has been 
temporarily rescued by a series of massive European and IMF bail-
outs whose price has included painful austerity measures. In politics, 
the former two-party system that gave the country stable single-party 
governments is now gone; as the traditional parties strive to form wob-
bly governing coalitions, new and menacing contestants have emerged 
on both the left and the extremist right. Society is in shambles. With 
the economy now going through its sixth year in deep recession, and 
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unemployment hovering above 25 percent (and around 55 percent for 
the young), anomie is on the rise and Greece looks increasingly anar-
chic. Meanwhile, Greece has become a byword and a cautionary tale, a 
latter-day “sick man of Europe” whose exit from the euro is no longer 
unthinkable. 
Two questions arise: What went wrong in Greece, when so much 
at first seemed to be going right? And how did such a democracy be-
come possible and manage to sustain itself for almost three decades? 
The first question calls for an explanation of the logic that led Greece 
to abandon a liberal political arrangement for another that eventually 
led to disaster; the second question requires an empirical study of the 
particular mechanisms that enabled the new arrangement to work for 
nearly three decades. Lacking a unified and concise theory about the 
specific Greek case, one must begin with the existing general theories 
about what makes some states fail and others succeed. These theories, 
broadly speaking, stress either the role of culture or that of institutions. 
Cultural theories relate the fate of states to culture, and more par-
ticularly to its geographical and historical determinants. Countries with 
hot climates (such as those in Africa), situated in dangerous areas (the 
Middle East or the Balkans, for instance), or with adverse histories (ex-
periences of having been colonized or engulfed by civil war, let us say) 
are more likely to remain poor and to fail politically than countries that 
enjoy more temperate climes, safer neighborhoods, and happier pasts. 
Cultural interpretations of Greece’s current political maladies (includ-
ing the common perception of Greeks as lazy) are not in short supply.2 
Institutional theories, by contrast, hold that nations stand or fall by 
their institutions—strong and resilient institutions mean that major po-
litical and economic crises can be withstood, while weak institutions 
crumple and fold under history’s harsh test. Daron Acemoglu and James 
Robinson, for instance, have recently advanced a comprehensive insti-
tutional theory of “why nations fail” that attributes this to a lack of po-
litical pluralism and therefore of inclusive economic institutions. “Rich 
nations are rich,” these authors argue, “because they managed to create 
inclusive institutions.” In contrast, the most common reason for the fail-
ure of nations today is the presence of extractive institutions, as these 
“keep poor countries poor and prevent them from embarking on a path 
to economic growth.”3
The Greek case, however, puts both conventional theories to a stern 
test. Cultural theories fall short of explaining how post-1974 Greece 
succeeded in building a pluralist political regime despite its ostensibly 
adverse geographical, historical, and cultural conditioning. And institu-
tional theories are at pains to account for Greece’s recent failure, which 
was not caused by a lack of inclusive political and economic institutions 
but rather happened in spite of them. 
Greece, especially when compared to other similarly debt-ridden Eu-
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ropean countries such as Spain, Italy, Portugal, or Ireland, is uniquely 
puzzling in at least two ways. It is both the only country in Europe that 
saw its state fail in key areas during the recent economic crisis, and the 
European country that has proven the most resistant to reform. To be 
credible, therefore, any explanation of the Greek puzzle must account 
for both the causes that led to state failure and the reasons for the ex-
ceptionally strong resistance to reforms aimed at restoring to Greece a 
sustainable state and the ability to compete in global markets. 
To this end, I will attempt to synthesize the cultural and institutional 
theories in order to propose a unified explanation that focuses on the 
role played by political mechanisms. The beginning of wisdom about 
the current Greek crisis is to recognize that it is fundamentally political, 
and that it has been long in the making. Greece’s failure is the outcome 
of a long process during which populism prevailed over liberalism and 
became hegemonic in society. I herein understand populism simply as 
democratic illiberalism and view it as the polar opposite of political lib-
eralism.4 It will be shown that, after having reached power in 1981, pop-
ulism permeated Greek politics and produced what I will call a “populist 
democracy,” which in turn required two mechanisms: A state bent on 
handing out political rents to practically every member of society; and a 
party system built to ensure the distribution of these rents in an orderly 
and democratic way—that is, by turns rather than in one go. Taken to-
gether, these two mechanisms led to a fine coordination of aims between 
the political class and the vast majority of Greeks, enabling both sides to 
exploit the state and its resources in a seemingly non–zero-sum fashion.
Early Success and the Path to Europe
Although many tend to forget it amid today’s ongoing crisis, Greece 
(along with Portugal) not only stood at the very forefront of the “third 
wave” of global democratization but also became one of its most exem-
plary cases. When the military regime that had ruled Greece for seven 
years collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions and failures, 
the country for a brief moment found itself in an absolute vacuum of 
power, internationally isolated, and on the brink of war with Turkey. 
Things began changing rapidly, however, when Constantine Karamanlis 
(1907–98), a former premier from the days before the colonels, decided 
to return from self-imposed exile and took a leading role (as prime min-
ister) in the transition to democracy. In just a few years, Karamanlis 
and his team transformed Greece into a fully democratic, economically 
buoyant state with liberal political and economic institutions. As if to 
crown this impressive effort, Greece was rewarded with EU member-
ship. Here is a brief account of the early Greek success story.
The first great plank in Karamanlis’s democratization program was 
the introduction of inclusive political institutions to serve as the foun-
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dation for a pluralist society. Among his initial measures was the full 
legalization of the Communist Party, together with other once-banned 
leftist parties. Armed with an impressive electoral majority, Karamanlis 
quickly neutralized the military as a political force and called a De-
cember 1974 plebiscite that eliminated the monarchy, thus leaving the 
elected presidency and the 300-member unicameral Parliament in sole 
charge. At the same time, he founded New Democracy (ND), a liberal 
conservative party, and encouraged the creation for the first time in con-
temporary Greek history of a moderately pluralist party system. Next, in 
early 1975 Karamanlis secured parliamentary passage of a new constitu-
tion that was the most liberal the country had ever had. The document’s 
aim was to facilitate the forging of a liberal pluralist system that, in 
Karamanlis’s words, would “reinforce the executive without making it 
any less responsible to parliament.”5 
The creation of inclusive political institutions would hardly have suf-
ficed had there been no means of achieving prosperity and assuring its 
wide distribution across society. The problem for the new democratic 
administration in Greece was that neither international conditions nor 
domestic economic structures favored growth. The two oil crises of 
the 1970s caused problems, as did the fear of a war with Turkey that 
made Greece one of the world’s highest per capita military spenders. 
No significant foreign aid arrived to offset these burdens. The economy 
remained dominated by small-scale agriculture, leaving Greece hard-
pressed to compete internationally. Given the circumstances, Karaman-
lis opted for a model of state capitalism similar to French dirigisme. His 
government sought to use business-friendly monetary policy, strategic 
investment, and infrastructure expansion in order to move Greece onto 
the path of modern economic development and greater competitiveness.
With inclusive political institutions firmly in place and a seemingly 
workable plan for economic growth, the Europeanization of Greece was 
Karamanlis’s third major goal. EU membership, he said, would “radi-
cally change the destiny of [Greece] and develop the virtues of the na-
tion while limiting its defects.”6 There was much more to be gained 
from membership than financial benefits. Joining the EU would rein-
force Greece’s fledgling pluralist institutions and safeguard the smooth 
operation of liberal democracy. It would also put an end to the country’s 
long history of dependence on the United States, thus strengthening na-
tional sovereignty. Above all, it would finally resolve Greece’s peren-
nial uncertainty—imposed by history and geography—about whether it 
belonged to the East or the West. Europe’s leaders at the time were 
so impressed by Greece’s progress that negotiations advanced speed-
ily, and in May 1978 Karamanlis was able to sign the accession treaty. 
After a short interim period, Greece became a full member of the EU in 
January 1981. 
Greece could now credibly claim to have become a fully democrat-
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ic, politically stable, economically solvent, liberal European state. But 
Karamanlis had moved to the presidency in 1980, and 1981 was also 
the year that Andreas Papandreou (1919–96) of the radical Panhellenic 
Socialist Movement (PASOK) won the premiership with a strong show-
ing at the polls. 
Populism Triumphant
Papandreou rose to power by attacking the liberal foundations of the 
fledgling postauthoritarian democracy from the left, questioning its le-
gitimacy and rejecting its goals. Whereas Karamanlis, who explicitly 
acknowledged the multiplicity of conflicts in society, had emphasized 
moderation and actively pursued political consensus, Papandreou intro-
duced populism in its purest form. A master at politicizing resentment, 
he offered the Greek people a wholly new symbolic master narrative ac-
cording to which society was divided between two inherently antagonis-
tic groups—an exploiting “establishment,” both domestic and foreign, 
and the pure “people” standing in opposition to it. Largely as a result of 
this division, Greek politics assumed a highly confrontational style and 
also turned distinctly majoritarian. It was to remain so for more than 
three decades.
In the 1981 national elections, PASOK, the party that Papandreou 
had founded only seven years earlier, won by a landslide and formed its 
first single-party government. The new government, abandoning Kara-
manlis’s strategy of state-led growth and now also receiving generous 
EU handouts, undertook state-directed redistribution. At the same time, 
political polarization, rather than subsiding, became more intense. By 
portraying Greek society as torn between the “forces of light” (meaning 
PASOK voters and sympathizers) and the “forces of darkness” (meaning 
opposition voters), the new government used the state and its resourc-
es to satisfy its own electoral constituencies and reap further electoral 
gains, while passing the cost on to the whole of society. 
In 1990, after almost a decade of populism, ND returned to office 
under the leadership of liberal politician Constantine Mitsotakis. Try-
ing to reverse previous practices, the new government moved swiftly 
to reinvigorate Greece’s economy, reinforce its political institutions, 
and repair strained relations with Washington and the European allies. 
With regard to the economy, the ND government made preparing the 
country for the European single market the top priority, and accord-
ingly moved to cut public spending and reform the civil service. A 
privatization agenda was adopted with the same goal in mind. The op-
position’s intense resistance made the proposed structural reforms and 
policy alternatives hard to implement, however, and in 1993 the ND 
government collapsed, opening the way for Papandreou and PASOK 
to return to power.
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After its dismal, defeat-capped spell in power in the early 1990s, ND 
faced a choice: Should it cling to liberalism or learn to play the game 
of vote-catching populism? As it turned out, the Mitsotakis government 
had been liberalism’s feeble last hurrah. Populism’s strong pull soon 
made it a permanent feature of Greek politics. By the mid-1990s, ND 
had rebranded itself as a “people’s party” and thereafter tried to outbid 
PASOK’s already excessive promises. This trend became particularly 
pronounced when Costas Karamanlis, the founder’s nephew, served as 
ND’s leader between 1997 and 2009. He expelled the most prominent 
proponents of political liberalism from the party and took to spouting 
rhetoric that made him sound more like Andreas Papandreou than like 
his own uncle and mentor. 
When Papandreou fell terminally ill and resigned the premiership in 
early 1996, the PASOK caucus in Parliament made Costas Simitis the 
new party leader and the premier of Greece. A moderate and methodi-
cal technocrat decidedly free of charisma or much appeal to the mass-
es, Simitis pursued a program of modernization focusing on extensive 
public investment in infrastructure, as well as on economic and labor 
reforms to harmonize the Greek economy with the rest of Europe. He 
led PASOK to electoral wins in 1996 and 2000, and as premier ushered 
Greece into the Eurozone. Despite his reformist efforts, though, Simi-
tis and his modernizing group found themselves “forced to rule within 
the entrenched material boundaries drawn by the party’s pro-popular 
policies in the 1980s.”7 In a real sense, PASOK remained permeated by 
populism, which fed cronyism, corruption, and inefficiency and led to 
its defeat at the polls in 2004. 
The ND governments that held office from 2004 to 2009 vowed to 
reform the state administration and fight inefficiency and corruption, 
but in reality accomplished little. As under PASOK, reforms remained a 
lost cause. Of the few reforms that ND tried, none was implemented suc-
cessfully despite the existence of several favorable factors, including “a 
unitary state, majoritarian and stable one-party governments with strict 
party discipline, and few veto players.”8 
Indeed, the failure to make badly needed changes in such key areas 
as pensions and health (under PASOK) and education (under ND) be-
came the most striking feature of all governments in Greece’s populist 
democracy. Not only were these reforms opposed by strong interests in 
society and never fully implemented, but the politicians who sought to 
introduce them were punished at the polls, and some retired from public 
life. Reformism stood exposed as a political loser.
Thus for three decades—from PASOK’s rise to power under An-
dreas Papandreou in 1981 to the resignation of his son, Prime Minister 
George Papandreou, to allow a caretaker government to deal with the 
debt crisis in 2011—Greece’s two major parties had been able to hold 
office alternately, in most cases commanding ample parliamentary ma-
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jorities: PASOK ruled during 1981–89, 1993–2004, and 2009–11; ND 
enjoyed office during 1990–93 and 2004–2009. The stillborn coalition 
governments that formed during the extraordinary circumstances of 
the short period extending from June 1989 to April 1990 (and that also 
included the Greek Communist Party) stand as an unusual parenthesis 
within the two major parties’ consistent alternation in power. During 
those decades, Greece developed as a populist democracy, a democrat-
ic subtype in which the party in government and (at least) the major 
opposition party both are populist. What were the nuts and bolts of this 
system, and how did it last for such a long time? In order to answer 
these questions, we must first understand the two chief mechanisms 
that made populist democracy feasible: the redistributive capacity of 
the increasingly large Greek state and the polarizing mechanics of the 
Greek party system.
Political Patronage, Greek-Style
In the view of many, political patronage is the main cause of the 
Greek crisis.9 In mainstream theory, patronage is seen as a linkage 
between politicians and citizens. Such patron-client ties are “based on 
direct material inducements targeted to individuals and small groups 
of citizens whom politicians know to be highly responsive to such 
side-payments and willing to surrender their vote for the right price.”10 
In this understanding, patronage has two features: first, a distribution 
of state-related benefits (or political rents) to specifically targeted so-
cial groups; and second, the material character of such inducements. 
Greece’s populist democracy, however, exhibited a variant of patron-
age whose features are notably different from those recognized by 
mainstream theory.
The first Greek particularity was that rents and other inducements 
or entitlements were not only material, but also included benefits such 
as widespread de facto immunity from the law. The second difference 
is related to the nature of populist democracy itself: Inducements were 
still targeted at specific groups but, since society had been divided into 
two irreconcilable parts represented by parties regularly alternating in 
power, all citizens could reasonably expect to gain from patronage once 
their own party won elections. 
Overall, Greek society became the recipient of three types of state-
related benefits: real incomes (such as salaries and pensions) derived 
from classical patronage functions; privileged protection against market 
risks; and impunity from the law. 
Until PASOK came to power, the Greek state was relatively small, 
employing about 510,000 people out of a population then numbering 
about ten-million. As shown by the time-series data provided by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) and corroborated by many other 
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sources, total public-sector employment in Greece skyrocketed during 
the 1980s (reaching 786,200 employees by 1990, an increase of more 
than 50 percent in a single decade) and continued to grow at least until 
2008. In that year, Greece had slightly more than a million public-sector 
employees—enough to make up a stunning 21 percent of the entire ac-
tive workforce—and this amid an overall national population that had 
grown by only about 10 percent, to around eleven-million people. Why 
would a populace that had grown by only a tenth need its civil servants 
to more than double in number?
A similar increase occurred in spending on pensions and other forms 
of social protection starting in the early 1980s, when “pensions were 
increased, coverage was extended to new groups of [the] population and 
the level of minimum pensions provided by IKA [Greece’s major pen-
sion fund for private wage earners] was fixed at 20 times the minimum 
wage of unskilled workers.”11 Social spending kept rising steadily over 
the following decades despite demographic and labor-market changes. 
In precrisis Greece, pension expenditures (which equaled 11.5 percent 
of GDP in 2005) were among the highest in the OECD, which averaged 
a mere 7.2 percent.12 The official retirement age in Greece was 65, but 
early retirement was widespread. Only 44 percent of workers aged be-
tween 55 and 64 were still actually holding jobs, as compared with an 
OECD average of 52 percent. At the same time, pensioners who had 
worked a full career (that is, until the age of 65) received on average a 
pension equal to 96 percent of their previous earnings, compared with 
an average of 59 percent for the OECD.
The Greek state also sought to shield a large number of professions 
for typically clientelistic reasons. In July 2011, the Finance Ministry 
presented a list of more than 130 closed-shop professions, including 
lawyers, pharmacists, engineers, architects, truck drivers, port work-
ers, auditors, electricians, financiers, private investigators, insurance 
consultants, hairdressers, newsstand operators, taxi drivers, real-estate 
agents, notaries, and street-market vendors. The common characteris-
tic of all these guild-like professions is that, through a dense tangle of 
regulations and licensing requirements, their members have enjoyed 
state-protected monopolies and profits ensured by law. 
Typically, the state imposed minimum price and profit levels as 
well as special parafiscal duties and other levies on taxpayers in order 
to make society as a whole prop up the closed-shop professions. Such 
charges had a regressive impact on income distribution and led to an 
ineffective allocation of state resources. Not surprisingly, they also 
triggered a boom in the number of such state-protected professions in 
recent years, as trade after trade lobbied for admission to the golden 
ring of state favor.13 It is also not surprising that resistance to reforms, 
even after the crisis made them imperative, has been especially strong 
among the members of these professions. 
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A third and still more outlandish form of distributing state-related 
resources across society was simply to let people expropriate them with 
impunity. For decades, Greeks were 
allowed to act illegally against the 
state’s interests with no punishment—
through rampant tax evasion, unau-
thorized construction, pension fraud, 
and legislative immunity. 
As fiscal authorities freely admit, 
a third of Greeks fail to pay the taxes 
that they owe. To a large extent, this 
has been because the law goes unen-
forced, especially in election years. In 
an effort to ameliorate the problem, 
the Greek state regularly grants tax 
amnesties as a way of encouraging 
voluntary compliance. The practice of informal building development, 
especially on public land, constitutes another avenue by which private 
individuals help themselves to state resources. It has been estimated that 
as many as a million homes and other dwellings have been built illegally 
in Greece in recent decades. In a fashion that resembles their response 
to rampant tax evasion, successive cash-strapped Greek governments 
have periodically promised to legalize illegally built dwellings for a fee. 
Then there is pension fraud. In 2012, the Ministry of Labor reported 
that about 40,000 persons had wrongly been collecting pension benefits, 
in some cases for as long as twenty years. According to other sources, 
the number of such pension cheats is actually closer to 200,000. Finally, 
there is the impunity enjoyed by state officials themselves. Members of 
Parliament are immune from criminal prosecution, arrest, or detention 
while in office. Moreover, any crimes alleged against them during their 
time in Parliament may be adjudicated only after a process of parlia-
mentary impeachment held by an ad hoc “special court.” In practice, 
however, parliamentary investigative committees have seldom allowed 
the lifting of immunity. These and other similar examples indicate that 
the vast majority of Greeks have been allowed to gain individually at the 
expense of the public good, while the rule of law has degenerated and 
corruption has flourished. 
For several decades, then, practically every Greek could reap rents 
from the state. The existence of such a varied array of rent-gathering 
mechanisms had a common effect on the Greek mindset, as “almost all 
Greeks, from large business owners to small landowners on islands and 
to municipal clerks in villages, [came to] believe it is natural to have 
some income which derives neither from work nor from risking capi-
tal.”14 Still, given the finite nature of state-related resources, there need-
ed to be a way of distributing them in a prudent and politically sustain-
For decades, Greeks 
were allowed to act 
illegally against the 
state’s interests with no 
punishment—through 
rampant tax evasion, 
unauthorized construc-
tion, pension fraud, and 
legislative immunity. 
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able way. This brings us to the second mechanism that made populist 
democracy workable for a time—the party system. 
A Polarized Two-Party System
The 1981 election spawned an unusual party system that combined 
the format of two-party politics with the mechanics of polarized plural-
ism, which I will call “polarized bipartism.” It served to keep society 
divided into two conflicting parts, each represented by a major party. 
The regular alternation in power of the two rival parties made possible 
the distribution of political rents to society in an orderly, democratic, 
and economical way. 
Interestingly enough, partisan polarization in Greece has not been 
primarily ideological, as happens in pluralist systems with multiple 
cleavages (such as differences of class, language, region, or religion, 
which often create deep social rifts) and a large spread of public opin-
ion. Greek polarization has instead been strategic polarization, pursued 
deliberately by pragmatic parties competing to grab the state single-
handedly and control its resources. To this purpose, each party had an 
incentive to step up polarization as it tried to win the nonideological, 
ambivalent voters in the middle through various inducements. This not 
only forged in-group solidarity; it also increased the insecurity of politi-
cal opposition and, therefore, the chances of its fragmentation.15
Not long after its transition to democracy and under the pressure of 
rising populism, Greece saw its party system go from moderate multi-
partism to an essentially two-party affair.16 From 1981 until the 2009 
elections, the Greek two-party system continued to function—on one 
level at least—as such systems normally do: There were two major par-
ties, each of which found itself in a position to compete for an absolute 
majority of seats in Parliament. One of the two would win a parliamen-
tary majority large enough to allow that party to govern alone. Most 
importantly, the two parties regularly alternated in power. 
Despite its two-party format, however, Greece’s party system dis-
played distinctly polarizing mechanics, which enabled political actors 
to portray society as being divided into two political camps, each re-
sembling a close-knit majoritarian community given to denying its op-
ponents’ legitimacy. As a result, the center—in the sense both of centrist 
parties and of moderate liberal ideological and policy positions—fell 
into decay. What was left was a polarized competition between rival 
sets of populist forces that vied against each other to represent “the 
people.”17 It may be helpful at this point to contrast the mechanics of 
Greece’s polarized bipartism with the classical two-party model.
According to the “spatial model” of party competition in liberal 
democracy,18 two-party systems are associated with ideological mod-
eration, centripetal tendencies, and the politics of compromise, as both 
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parties, despite the inescapable multidimensionality of issues, have 
an incentive to converge at the center of the party-competition space 
(where the median voter dwells) by “soft-pedaling cleavages.” In clas-
sic bipartism, therefore, centripetalism becomes a rewarding strategy 
because the majority of voters, especially the undecided, are located 
somewhere between the two major parties, creating a situation in which 
“the spread of opinion is small and [its] distribution single peaked.”19 
The paradox presented by Greece’s populist democracy should be 
obvious by now: It displays the format of bipartism, but produces the 
mechanics of what Giovanni Sartori has described as a “polarized 
pluralist” system, including a prevalence of centrifugal rather than 
centripetal political tendencies and an irresponsible opposition that 
thrives on the politics of outbidding or overpromising. The result is 
a novel type of party system that develops in populist democracies 
and is here termed “polarized bipartism.” The paradox becomes even 
more intriguing if we consider that bipartism, precisely because of 
an expectation of alternation in government, is presumed to nurture 
political moderation, consensus on fundamentals, and centripetal par-
ty competition. How to explain this paradox of centrifugal dynamics 
in a two-party format? The answer hinges on the nature and logic of 
populism itself, especially its tendency to reduce all politics to a single 
dimension of conflict, its emphasis on deliberate polarization, and its 
quest for majoritarianism. 
Unlike classic bipartism in liberal democracy, where a variety of 
cleavages intersect to produce a multidimensional voting space, the type 
of bipartism found in populist democracy tends to reduce party competi-
tion to a single dimension. Politics, in other words, becomes a confron-
tation between a majority (the masses, the people, the underprivileged, 
the poor) and some minority (the elite, the establishment, the privileged, 
the rich). Given this simple, albeit symbolically powerful, ordering of 
society along a single dimension, as well as the strong majoritarian im-
pulses that are typical of populism-permeated systems, both major par-
ties in populist democracies have every incentive to play up rather than 
soft-pedal polarization. In such cases, as issue-based voting becomes 
secondary at best, parties strive to vilify their opponents, outbid them, 
or both. Accordingly, as the average voter turns to the highest bidder, 
societies tend to cluster around opposed poles; as the majority of the 
people cleave to one pole or the other, the middle ground is lost and the 
median voter becomes a rare phenomenon. 
The problem, however, is that when politics is polarized, bipartism 
does not work. In such a system, in which bipartism fails to produce 
a political society characterized by moderation and what John Rawls 
famously called “overlapping consensus,” polarization breeds politi-
cal instability and the system becomes dysfunctional. In this case “we 
should expect the parties to become more than two and another type of 
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party system” to emerge.20 And indeed, this is exactly what happened 
in Greece during the successive elections of May and June 2012, when 
bipartism collapsed and gave way to extreme pluralism, with once-mar-
ginal parties such as the left-wing Syriza coalition and the right-wing 
Golden Dawn gaining significant (or in the case of Syriza, even major) 
shares of seats in Parliament. 
A Planned “Tragedy of the Commons”
As the crisis raged, former PASOK deputy premier Theodoros Pan-
galos sparked controversy by presenting it as a typical “tragedy of the 
commons” in which selfish and reckless individuals chose personal 
gain over societal well-being. As he told Parliament on 21 Septem-
ber 2010, “We [Greeks] all ate it up together following a practice of 
wretchedness, bribery, and squandering of public money.” The prob-
lem with this and similar interpretations, however, is that the Greek 
political system is not an unmanaged commons in which uncoordi-
nated individuals try to increase the marginal utility of public goods to 
themselves. Instead, the Greek crisis has been the result of a perfectly 
institutionalized political system that was built with intent and design, 
and remained functional for a long time because of a high level of co-
ordination that was achieved between the country’s political class and 
the vast majority of Greeks.
The crisis in Greece has been the outcome of its particular system 
of populist democracy—that is, a democracy in which both the party in 
office and its main rival are populist. As noted above, two mechanisms 
made this system endure for nearly three decades. The first was a state 
intent on distributing political rents as widely as possible; the second 
was a party system ensuring the widespread delivery of state benefits 
via party rotation in office. With two strong populist parties regularly 
alternating in power and being in control of a generous state keen to dis-
tribute political rents, voters learned that the state was up for grabs and 
that it was better to associate with the state through party contacts rather 
than venture into the market through competition. They also learned 
through electoral iteration that even if one’s party lost at the polls, it was 
likely to return to power next time around. Politicians learned that there 
was no mileage in reformism—society would only penalize them for it 
at the ballot box. Based on this widely shared understanding, Greece’s 
populist democracy worked relatively well until the crisis broke out, 
instantly revealing that the Greek state had run out of resources. From 
there, it was only a matter of time until the 2012 elections confirmed the 
collapse of Greece’s populist democratic system.
Liberal democracy rests on a contract between the governors and 
the governed based on institutional and other tacit agreements, all of 
which assume that individual well-being depends on the promotion of 
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the public good. With such an understanding, the state remains impar-
tial and is widely seen as aiming to furnish public goods (as opposed 
to political rents). To the extent that states can act in accord with such 
rules, they gain legitimacy, and as societies by and large also abide by 
the same rules, politics turns into a positive-sum game.21 Contrast this 
with the social and political contract that developed in Greece’s populist 
democracy.22 According to the logic of that system, the state was not an 
impartial promoter of the public welfare, but rather a resource to be ap-
propriated by individuals eager to enhance their own private well-being. 
Yet, because of the alternation in power of the major parties, the system 
was anything but a zero-sum game. In reality, almost all members of 
society gained by turns. This also points to a credible explanation of 
the system’s durability, based on the principal-agent theory of voting in 
democracy. 
Consider, first, how this theory works in an ordinary liberal democ-
racy, where voters (or principals) “lay down, ex ante, a contingent re-
ward structure for their leader (or agent). That reward structure ties the 
agent’s ambition [to remain in office] to her [current] performance.”23 
The theory rests on two key assumptions. The first is that principals and 
agents have different and often conflicting interests. The second is that 
agents enjoy a lopsided informational advantage over their principals. 
Taken together, these two assumptions imply that agents, unless closely 
watched, have both the means and the motive to act opportunistically 
and betray their principals’ interests. Principals retain the last word, 
however, since they always have the power to choose new agents. 
The theory worked differently in Greece, however. As a result of the 
political contract that came to prevail under long populist rule, none of 
the above assumptions could hold true. In an environment of perfectly 
symmetric information, principals and agents became entangled in a 
high-level coordination game aimed at exploiting the state, albeit with 
each set of actors serving its own particular interests, whether by raking 
in state-related benefits (principals) or holding on to power and office 
(agents). Ironically, and rather perversely, within such a system reform-
ism would not pay off. And on occasions when parties or, more usually, 
individual politicians were bold—or careless—enough to introduce a 
reform agenda aimed at promoting the general public welfare rather than 
particular interests, they were punished at the polls. 
The current financial and economic crisis has led to the demolition 
of the two mechanisms that, for decades, had supported Greece’s popu-
list democracy. On the one hand, the Greek state, now short of external 
funds and with its creditors hounding it to apply harsh austerity mea-
sures, no longer has rents to hand out to society. On the other hand, the 
two-party system that was vital to the orderly distribution of rents lies 
shattered and, for the time being at least, has given way to an extremely 
polarized form of multipartism. 
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Also gone along with these two mechanisms, of course, is the old 
sociopolitical contract on the basis of which voters and politicians co-
ordinated their actions, individually benefiting from the state at the ex-
pense of the public good. Quite clearly, then, Greece’s political leader-
ship badly needs to forge a new, shared social contract. It must provide 
the mechanisms that will restore the liberalism which populism put to 
rout—a liberalism that must return if Greece is to have a better future 
and a safe place within the European fold.
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